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Abstract
This survey is an overview on the literature that investigates
the relationship between the institutions and development processes.
The attention it has been focus, in sequence, on the ways in which
it has been performed the empirical and the theoretical analysis
of the relationship between the economic development and the
role of institutions. As it is clear the ￿rst di¢ culty is the de￿n-
ition of what an institution is, so the survey gives dig relevance
to the di⁄erent manners to conceptualize the notion of institu-
tion. Another di¢ culty arises from the perplexity about how the
e¢ ciency of the institutions can be evaluated. This problem is
related to the necessity to close o⁄ in the right way the weight
and the in￿ uence of the institutions respect to the other variables
on the economic development. The analysis of the complemen-
tarities involved in the development processes, can be a useful
way to explain some kinds of relationship between institutions
and development processes especially in the short run. The use
of more elaborated indices to measure the in￿ uence of institu-
tions in the economic system and of the coentegration models
can improve the reliability of the empirical analysis. In the same
manner the supermodularity and the supermodular games can ef-
￿ciently explain the mechanism of the strategic complementarity
between di⁄erent kinds of institution generating virtuous devel-
opment processes from a theoretical point of view. Necessarily,
in the future, both the analysis must be integrated but, for the
time being, the state of art in the two approaches represent a very
good starting point for new outcomes related to the investigation
on these type of kind of economic phenomena.
11 Introduction
The analysis of institutional framework and of its in￿ uence on the eco-
nomic performance is universally recognized from both economic theory
and social and historical ￿elds. The wealth distribution, the allocation
of economic power, the new opportunities of development are strictly
connected with the institutional environment.
It is well known that the increase of the wealth in the economic sys-
tem is strictly connected with radical structural changes concerning the
productive system, the level of consumption and the intensity of trade,
but it is also clear that it is not possible to separate these phenomena
from essential institutional change.
The institutional variables become fundamental in the development
processes when they are no longer to considered exogenous, but assume
an endogenous feature inside the mechanism of the economic changes.
The use of the institutional variable, to explain development processes,
is mainly considered strictly connected to the alterations of the invest-
ments level. From an investor point of view it is more pro￿table to
invest in countries where exist an institutional framework that creates
the conditions to reduce the uncertainty and to facilitate the task of the
economic agents. From this perspective it is an undeniable fact that
an institutional context, di⁄using signals of reliability, provides incen-
tives to invest since reduces the probability of unexpected events and
stimulates a self - feeding (self feeds) virtuous circle.
The previous comment can be considered trivial but it is important
to starting from this prosaic consideration in order to organize an orig-
inal and incisive content analysis of the main contributions concerning
the relationship between the institutional variables and the level of de-
velopment. From an orthodox point of view the economy is a system
in which interact agents with a perfect knowledge of the reality, after
this assumption all the developed analysis meet several di¢ culties to
explain exactly what happens in the reality. Even after starting to con-
sider other variables like the time and the uncertainty on the states of
the world, an institution as the ￿rm is nothing else but a simple pro-
duction function with the objective to maximize the pro￿t. This type of
theoretical approach doesn￿ t consider the existence of other institutions
and reject the possibility that the public sector could be an active vari-
able in the description of the economic context. It is an incontrovertible
evidence that there are market institutions and no market institutions,
they interact each other and determine the level of production and the
resource￿ s allocation, this is a situation of complementarity generating
relevant implications on the economy and in particular on the economic
2development.
Starting from the beginning of last century the relevance of the in-
stitutional variable assumed more and more relevance in the economic
analysis on the strength of the historical, sociological and economical
view. Mises (1920) began to consider the property rights as relevant
factor in the economic analysis criticizing the predominant tendency to
regard the market as the unique solution to determine the economic
performances.
Commons ( 1931 ) faced the analysis of the institutional variable
retaining that the collective action was fundamental to explain the eco-
nomic dynamics, thus the institutions came out from dynamic economic
interaction determined by the collective actions and the con￿ ict of in-
terests. He started his careful scienti￿c observation thinking that the
main di¢ culty to face is to ￿nd an exhaustive de￿nition of institution
and this is actually a preeminent problem in the economic literature1.
Coase ( 1937 ) radically changed the conception of the ￿rm introduc-
ing it in an institutional dimension and stating that the transaction costs
were the main reason of the ￿rm existence. Furthermore he a¢ rmed that
the e¢ ciency of the economic system was strongly in￿ uenced by the way
in which the ￿rms behaved and carried out the mechanism of trade with
the other economic agents ( Coase, 1991 ).
A further evolution it was represented when became important to
taking into account the existence of di⁄erent level of knowledge of the
reality between the economic agent ( Von Hayek, 1945 ). Considering
the existence of an heterogeneous level of the reality￿ s perception it im-
plies that di⁄erent agents, at same time, are in￿ uenced from disparate
experiences, consequentially they behave in di⁄erent ways and interpret
some circumstances from unlike points of view. If the agents belong to
the same institution then they show an homogeneous level of perception
of the reality, whereby it is unmistakable that the presence of institu-
tional forms further the di⁄usion of knowledge and, as a consequence,
the same behavior between them.
Starting from these primordial but, at same time, fundamental meth-
ods to face the analysis of the institutions in the economic system it is
possible to mention several contributions developed during the subse-
quent years, able to explain more and more the role of institutional
variable in the economic analysis.
The traditional institutionalism represents the starting point of oth-
ers two approach that actually are the main manners to analyze the
institutions in the economic framework. It is well known that these kind
of approach are constituted by the Institutional Political Economy and
the New Institutional Economics.2 Besides it is not useful for the topic
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gies between the two kind of literatures in the Institutional Economics,
seeing that the principal objective is to point out which is the contribute
of the economic literature to explain, if there exist, a way to explain the
role of institutions in the development.
The aim to consider the main contributions of the economic litera-
ture related to the relationship between development processes and in-
stitutional framework represents a point of departure to underline some
necessary aspects that can encourage further original analysis.
2 The role of Institutions in the economic system:
an overview on the main features
The connections between institutional environment and opportunities
of development in an economic system must be described considering a
multiplicity of perspectives, both related to the development phenomena
and connected to the di⁄erent de￿nitions of Institution given from eco-
nomic literature. The analysis of these relationships become an useful
instrument to delineate a propitious "atmosphere " for positive evolution
of the economic system. This is strongly supported from the evidence
that both reach countries and poor countries start to grow when there
are some circumstances that reduce the decreasing returns and stimulate
economies of scale. As an instance, considering the case of human capi-
tal, it is well - rendered that positive externalities are induced by learning
processes and that, in this particular case, the role of institutions able
to support development process is not uniquely linked to what happens
in the market. Thus in this context the institutions operate outside
the market, but, in the same breath, they in￿ uence a variable directly
involved in the market mechanism making easier the di⁄usion and the
quality of the human capital￿ s education.
Thinking about the theory of endogenous growth it seems to be clear
that the institutions can in￿ uence the development in the long run but
it is equally clear that this approach doesn￿ t split the e⁄ects on the eco-
nomic performances in￿ uenced by di⁄erent type of institutions. The last
careful consideration is just mentioned as an example of how the expla-
nation and the description of the causes that determine the development
processes cannot be made using a representation extremely simplistic of
the reality. Each economic phenomenon is very complex and, for this
reason, it is likely that could be some mistakes when the analysis con-
siders only a part of the variables useful to explain the development
processes (Adelman, 2002).
Many times, in the ￿eld of the theories on the economic development,
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founded on extremely contrastive positions, this situation proceeds from
the use of criteria that tries to explain the underdevelopment taking into
account a single motivation and, consequentially, this implies the sugges-
tion of single remedy to promote virtuous mechanisms in the economic
system.
Thus it is necessary to underline that the development process is a
highly no linear phenomenon, therefore it is not possible, as an exam-
ple, to consider the existence of the same production function for all the
countries of the world. Inevitably the multiplicity of the di⁄erent con-
texts implies that the path of the development is no uniquely determine
for all the economies and, furthermore, the conditions that characterize
initially the economic system considerably in￿ uence the subsequent de-
velopment process. In fact the development path, that can be followed by
each single country, not only is characterized by peculiar uniqueness, but
it is also easily in￿ uenced by particular features proper of each economic
system up to determine di⁄erent results of policy (Adelman,2002).
In some institutional contexts the productive structures has showed
ability from a quantitative and a qualitative point of view, acting au-
tonomously, without an extreme reliance on unannounced periods of
economic crisis.
As an example it is possible to analyze the role of the institutions
in the di⁄erent theories of endogenous growth considering: the source
of growth, the externalities or the coordination problems involved, the
in￿ uential institutions and organization forms, and ￿nally the economic
policy instruments ( Amable, 2000 ). In this way becomes clear how is
incorporated the notion of institution in several growth model and the
role of the main hypothetical links between institutions and endogenous
growth but it is not very guaranteed that every implications considered
can be all - encompassing of the any possible economic scenarios.
However, using this type of approach, allows to begin a preliminary
distinction between the probable externalities, the policies decisions and
the role of institutional structures. In this way becomes feasible to point
out any complementarities a⁄ecting on the development processes, in-
deed it is more simple to underline the in￿ uence of particular type of
institutions on the development than to specify their joint e⁄ect on the
economic performances.
Before to go ahead, analyzing the role of externalities, it is necessary
to illustrate the main empirical contributes to explain the relationship
between development and institutions.
From a theoretical point of view there are many roles assigned to
the institutions, thus it is important to outline a preliminary scheme
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the economic mechanism. De￿ning the institutions as a set of rules
determining the members￿behavior of the community, it is possible to
pinpoint it ( ) as internal rules of the game and it can be separate in
three di⁄erent categories.
The ￿rst category is represented from the constitutional rules, con-
sisting in fundamental principles passed on in writing form or in oral
form. The second category is constituted by the institutional arrange-
ments corresponding to the rules of the collective or individual choice.
The third category is the cultural system as the behavioral rules,
the religious belief, the habits and the customs that necessarily in￿ u-
ence the manner to face the economic interactions in agent￿ s behalf
(Buchanan,1990), (Kaiser, Ostrom, 1982), (Feeny, Picht, 1993).
The "rules of the game" are important for two main reasons. Firstly
they guarantee a fundamental set of environmental conditions to make
easier the human interactions and, at same time,they ensure that the
behaviors of economic agents, in the speci￿c contexts can be predictable,
this facilitates the individual decisions and the bargaining between the
counter - parties, eliminating the uncertainties and, consequentially, as
an example, the actions of two agents can be coordinate and can generate
e¢ cient agreements in the transaction. Secondly the rules contain some
wasteful behaviors and can stimulate convenient actions for all the agents
(Nelson, Sampat 2001).
Thus it becomes clear that the more useful tool for a theoretical
analysis able to describe the institutional mechanisms is the games the-
ory. In succession, within this section, there will be a particular review
starting from the observation on the institutions like the rules of the
game and concluding with the North￿ s design of the institution. This
type of structure represents a functional choice to get an original per-
spective of the economic literature concerning the concept of institution
and the development processes.
2.1 How di⁄erent kinds of institution has been mod-
eled
One of the ￿rst de￿nitions of the institutions as complex rules of the
game was given by Shubik (Shubik, 1975 ), afterward Schotter (Schot-
ter,1981 and 1986) pinpointed the institutions as the manner in which
the games was played, while the rule of the game could emerged sponta-
neously or on the base of a decision to devise a system ( rules ) ordered
by a higher sphere.
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the institutions was applied by Sudgen (1989) properly to underline the
coordination￿ s problems between the agents and the importance of the
cooperation, these two features establishing the main points on which it
can be possible to develop a newsworthy analysis of the institutions.
The Transaction Cost Economics represents a manner to face the
study of the phenomena related to the ￿rm and market, clearly this
￿eld is strictly related to the study of the economic institutions. Af-
ter the initial and fundamental contribution of Ronald Coase ( 1937 )
it was implemented by the signi￿cant scienti￿c activity of Williamson.
The existence of the opportunistic behaviors it is one of the causes that
determine transaction costs ( Willamson 1975 , 1985 ), but it is also
important to consider the transaction costs due to the existence of other
phenomena as: the agency costs that arise among the di⁄erent agents op-
erating in the ￿rm environment ( owners, managers, debt holders etc..)
( Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ); the costs justi￿ed by the necessity to
obtain informations ( Stigler, 1961 ); the costs connected with the coor-
dination of input in the production ( Alchian and Demsezt, 1972 ); the
measurement costs determined by the necessity of the buyer to precisely
estimate the attributes of the traded items. The source of these costs is
clearly represented by the bounded rationality, the uncertainty and the
opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore it is also important to mention the
relevance of the transaction - cost politics ( North, 1990 ), in this way
it is pointed out the in￿ uence of transaction costs on the e¢ cacy of the
policies on the economic system, in particular become very important
the role of the "instrumental rationality" in the economic and policy
decisions In this perspective the transaction cost politics must be con-
sidered as a conceptual framework to understand the phenomena linked
to the economic policy making ( Dixit, 1996). This kind of problems can
be rise mainly in case of the delegation, in which very easily it is possi-
ble to observe di¢ culties in the control and monitoring, uncertainty of
the opportunistic behavior and the impossibility of binding the actions
of agency successors, that is because, obviously, the policy agents are
characterized from bounded rationality. Considering transaction costs
politics, in other words starting from the existence of asymmetric infor-
mation and limited commitment possibilities in the political processes
and economic policy - making, it is possible to underline the hypotheti-
cal e⁄ects on the economic system of less development countries ( Dixit,
2003 ). In this case it is highlighted the importance to introduce an
e¢ cient reform of the rules and institutions able to facilitate the inter-
action between the agents acting in the political game, thus the design of
appropriate constitutions, institutions, organizations and incentives can
7guarantee the better opportunities for the economic and policy system.
Furthermore it is important to consider the relevance of the scholars￿
e⁄orts to point out the fundamental role of the Adverse Selection and
the Moral Hazard. This type of problems is faced, mainly, in the Prin-
cipal - Agent model and in the economics of organization, the tangible
di⁄erence from the approach of the transaction cost economics is that
the agents maximize their own utility putting into e⁄ects sel￿sh behav-
ior leaving out other typology of choices determined by the willingness
to cooperation with other agents. In this framework the high asym-
metric information holds a fundamental role, following this logic this
situation can prevent the development of the transaction costs (Akerlof,
1970); numerous links exist also in the case of the literature related to
the sharecropping, in which it is analyzed, with particular attention, the
case of the underdeveloped countries using a theoretical framework that,
afterward, will evolve in the principal agent theory (Stiglitz, 1974). This
types of approach represent a way to formalize the existence of some
institutions that avoid the problems generated by the imperfect infor-
mation, especially using the theories of mechanism design.
The institutional framework of an economic system narrows and
binds the possibilities for the agents to behave in the business climate
and, at same time, patterns the incentives and organization for collective
action. Considering the theory of collective action ( Olson, 1965 ) it is
clear that the institutions play a fundamental role in order to avoid the
collective action problems. It is well known that the agents, belonging
to the large groups, can cooperate when there are institutions able to
promote the cooperation, the monitoring and the right punishment of
deviators. As an example it is useful to mention the analysis of the dif-
ferent irrigation systems in the South India ( Bardhan, 2000 ) in which
it is pointed out that these systems are better safeguarded when there
exist some people responsible to monitor and punish the rule breaking
and able to evaluate if the cost is divided in proportion of the user￿ s
size. In the same analysis there is an important result concerning the
negative e⁄ects of the group size on the cooperation.
The cooperation between the agents operating in institutional envi-
ronment is a fundamental characteristic that a⁄ects the collective deci-
sions, it can emerge spontaneously or can be fruit of norms purposely
created and structured that can facilitate the di⁄usion of cooperative
behaviors between the agents. In case the cooperation is favorite from
norms (formal institutions ), it is the consequence of an exogenous struc-
ture that corresponds to the rules of the game; when does not exist a
formal structure that induces the agents to pursue cooperative behav-
iors, it is reasonable that the spontaneous cooperation is fruit of the
8knowledge, di⁄used between the agents, that it is necessary to interact
continuously and repeatedly in order to obtain positive outcome (Axel-
rod, 1997).
It is not right to forget the role played by property rights that can
be essential to make an economic system e¢ cient and advanced. They
become more important when they are articulates in such way to allow
to the agents to act without uncertainty and if they are properly settled
with enforcement￿ s mechanisms (Alchian, 1965, Demsetz, 1964).
To the purpose of the present analysis regarding the links between
institutions and development it is relevant to consider a framework of
the property rights inside of which it is clearly de￿ned the enforcement,
especially in the case when the resources become insu¢ cient because of
the increase of the population or in the case of technological changes
(Demsetz, 1967).
Following the New Institutional Economics approach in the e⁄ort to
incorporate the institutional variable into the neoclassical theory it is
possible to point out many di⁄erent type of relationship between insti-
tution and economic phenomena. Beyond the theories relative to: the
property rights, the economic of imperfect information, the collective
action and the evolution of cooperation norms. There are other possi-
ble perspectives to mention as: the distinction between institutions and
organizations ( North, 1990 ), the studies on the Governance structures
( Furubotn and Richter, 1997 ) ( Willamson, 1981 ), the corruption￿ s
phenomena ( Nye, 1967 ), the concept of Social Capital ( Putnam, 1983
) ( Sobel, 2002 ), there can be possibility to continue this list of dif-
ferent literature￿ s contributions, but take into account this wide range
of perspectives it becomes necessary to rationalize the description of
the linkages between institution and economic development focusing the
attention on the metodology used to introduce this kind of relationship.
2.2 The New Institutional Economics perspective
The North￿ s analysis considers the institutions substantially e¢ cient and
mainly it can evolve trying to maintain their e¢ ciency (North, 1981);
afterwards his attention is concentrated to point out the centrality of
the " path dependency" concept in the institutional framework analysis.
This characteristic corresponds to the stability of the rules generated
by the conventions and the strengthened uses that are respected even
if they demonstrate their ine¢ ciency. In brief North underlines the low
reactivity of the institutional mechanisms to the changes picked by the
new evolutionary tendencies.
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the costs of the institutional changes, in most of the cases, bear down on
a set of agents that doesn￿ t correspond to the totality of the agents that,
after the switch, will make use of the new institutional arrangement.
Given that the set of agents paying these costs will get in the future
less bene￿ts and on the other side the remaining part of the agents will
enjoy of these bene￿ts without any sacri￿ce. In this type of situation
the institutions tend to maintain their framework even if they generate
ine¢ ciency in the economic system ( North, 1990 ). The framework of
the repeated games with multiple equilibria, generated from a speci￿c
set of informations and expectations for each players, can be a useful
representation of the "path dependency" concept.
North retains that the institutions evolve towards an e¢ cient model
at the time that they reach the objective to reduce the transaction costs
corresponding to the costs of the evaluation of the assets and the condi-
tions of the change and to the costs to protect the rights and contract
conditions. Following this perspective become perceptible the impor-
tance of the way in which the institutional framework of the economic
system changes during the time rather than the outcomes reached in the
assets￿allocation. The attainment of Pareto e¢ ciency is achievable fol-
lowing an e¢ cient evolutionary path of the institutional switching that
allows to take advantage from the optimal exchange.
The fundamental issue is to characterize the reasons that determines
the existence and the persistence of divergent development paths. In
point of fact there exist some informal institutional constraints covering
fundamental role in the early stages of development processes. Well
de￿ned cultural conditions, in some cases, prevent the evolution of the
economic institutions towards a model able to stimulate the innovation,
the protection of the competition and the respect of contracts. In such
context it is unmistakable that can be generated rules able to shrink the
entrance, prevent mobility of the factors and encourage the corruption.
Bardhan ( 1991 ) analyzes the stability of the institutions that react
slowly to the innovative pushes. In fact the "path dependency " depends
from the costs due to the changes that burden on a part of all the agents
belonging to the society, this implies their resistance. Furthermore even
if some agents can get advantage from the changes, they refuse because
they can damage the group of society at which they belong. Ultimately
the length of speci￿c institutional framework does not depend from the
economic results but from other factors like social structures and cultural
values.
Following the North￿ s perspective it is clear that the institutions have
to reach a complete arrangement to the "informal constraints" existing
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between formal institutions and informal institutions cannot be extended
for a long period of time.
It is crucial in the North￿ s analysis the relationship of interdepen-
dence between formal and informal level of the institutions. The lack
of correspondence between cultural level and ethics of a society with
the institutions and formal rules determines dyscrasias encouraging con-
trastive behaviors with legal rules and coercing the formal institutions to
adapt to informal institutions. Taking into account this concept become
important to point out that the lack of respect of the rules orients the
evolution of the economy towards less e¢ cient goals and slows down the
economic growth.
The equilibrium condition in the institutional framework correspond
to a situation in which no one players want to change strategies to modify
the rules up to the time of one of the player perceives the prospective
advantage coming from a change and, at same time, attains to impose
it to other players. It is not ruled out the possibility that the change
could be organized by some agents that want to build an institutional
arrangement less e¢ cient than the previous, this type of problem could
be solved adopting a system that allows only to more e¢ cient solution to
grow up. Thus the common willingness to determine an e¢ cient change
represent the most important factor in order to generate an e⁄ective and
durable shift in the institutional framework.
From this point of view North analyzes the motivations for which, in
some cases, the institutions tend to evolve so that the economic devel-
opment is encouraged and assumes self - sustained characteristic while
di⁄erent situations could be a barrier to the progress and improvement of
economic conditions (North, 1990). This is a fundamental step because,
on the base of it, the institutions are considered equally to the pref-
erences and the technological constraints. In this way they in￿ uence the
economic environment that is around the development processes, fur-
thermore appears clear that an institutional framework cannot be con-
sistent with whatsoever type of organization. Starting from this split
- up it is possible to consider the institutions as rules of the game and
the organizations, that correspond to the groups of individuals having
the same purpose, as a single player. However there exist di⁄erences in
the interior dynamics that characterize the institutions and the organi-
zations, but on the other side the interpretation of their role is funda-
mental to determine the source of the economic decisions and the their
consequences. Analyzing the North￿ s contribution to the interpretation
of the institutions￿role in the economic system it is obvious to de￿ne
the institutions as a formal and informal framework that in￿ uences and
11determines the interactions between the economic agents.
There are an other way to classify the institutions considering dif-
ferent hierarchical levels as proposed from Williamson ( 2000 ). He
distinguishes four di⁄erent levels in which are set in di⁄erentx otypes of
institutions, this hierarchical scheme is organized taking into account
the frequency of change of the institutions belonging to each level. In
the Level 1 he considers the informal institutions strictly connected to
the social structure of the society as tradition and social norms. Clearly
this type of institutions change in a very long time and he estimates a
minimum time of change corresponding to one hundred years and a max-
imum period of change equal to thousand years. He brings in the Level 2
the formal institutions corresponding to the rules related to the property
rights, bureaucracy system and the distributions of powers across di⁄er-
ent levels of government, the frequency of change is included between ten
and one hundred years. In the Level 3 he introduces the rules relative
to the transactions among governance structures and that one related to
the regulation of the contractual relationships, they have a frequency of
change between one and ten years and are clearly in￿ uenced by the types
of change in the Level 1 and Level 2. The level 4 is composed from rules
that inzin￿ uence the resources￿allocation as the social security systems
and capital ￿ ow controls, this type of rules can be change in a very short
time and can a⁄ect the employment, the prices and the outputs. The
four levels are completely connected each other, the higher level ( Level
1 ) represents a constraint for the level below and so on till the
last level considered. Thus there is a connection top down between
the di⁄erent levels, but, at same time, there exists a connection bottom
up because the lower level (Level 4 ) in￿ uences the level immediately
above and so on till the ￿rst level by a feedback reaction. The many
interactions between institutions belonging to di⁄erent levels give the
idea that a change in the institutions located in some level can generate
a chain of changes in the other levels, the change in the Level 4 represents
the impact on the economic system of the all previous changes happened
in the levels above. In this way the institutions can signi￿cantly a⁄ect
the development processes and the economic development can in turn
in￿ uence the institutional framework by feedback action, clearly it can
happen in a very long period of time considering that the ￿rst level of
institution could be changed in at least one hundred years.
Inside the perspective of New Institutional Economics Aoki ( 2001 )
distinguishes the institutions as: rules of the game, players of the game
and equilibrium strategies of the game. The ￿rst de￿nition is strictly re-
lated to the North￿ s conceptualization of the institutions, the second one
is arise from the Nelson￿ s classi￿cation of institutions as players and the
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tions as an equilibrium strategy of the players in a game can be describe
from a two di⁄erent points of view: in the evolutionary game approach
the conventions and the agents coevolve determining the equilibrium
strategies of the game and, so, the institutions, Young ( 1998 ), Bowles (
2000 ); in the repeated game approach, considering the concept of sub-
game perfect equilibrium, it is clear that the strategy of each player is
a comprehensive plan of actions contingent on future states, so each ac-
tion of the game is a Nash Equilibrium and self - enforcing because is an
action prescribed for determined contingency, that implies the existence
of an institutional mechanism that arises in particular circumstances (
Greif, Milgrom, Weingast, 1994 ), ( Milgrom, North, Weingast, 1990 ).
Aftyer this analysis, mainly focused on the many aspects character-
izing the New Institutional Economics approach, becomes clear that it
is not very simple to de￿ne, from a theoretical point of view, the in-
stitutions and, for this reason, it is also too di¢ cult to point out the
main relationship between the institutional framework and development
process.
The study of the dynamics related to the institutions can be faced
from di⁄erent perspectives, there can be di⁄erent approaches because it
is possible to distinguish the institution on the base of several charac-
teristic. It is well known that the economic system can be in￿ uenced
from the presence of: legal institutions, political institutions, social in-
stitution and economic institutions. Thus the in￿ uence on the economic
performance of a given country can be explained from a di⁄erent stand-
point and using di⁄erent research areas, that feature contribute to make
more complex the attempt to explain any possible relationship between
institutional framework and development processes.
3 The institutional variables and the economic de-
velopment in the empirical analysis
The empirical investigations relative to the relationship between institu-
tions and development gives rise to many scienti￿c contributes especially
during the last part of previous century and the ￿rst years of the present
one. It would be more correct to point out that a wide part of empiri-
cal investigations considers the relationship between the institutions and
growth that is di⁄erent, as it is well known, from the concept of economic
development. These analysis are characterized from di⁄erent concepts
of institutions, more precisely they concern to analyze partially the ef-
fects of the institutions on the growth because they consider only some
aspects of the institutional components that must be taken into account
13in a more complex way. Besides this crucial and critical aspect will be
considered in a more speci￿c way in the next part of this article. The
existence of corruption is considered as a way to deviate from the for-
mal duties by actions or activities implemented without the respect of
the society￿ s legal framework, thus there can be a negative relationship
between corruption and investment ( Mauro, 1995 ) mainly considering
as a measures of the institutional variables two indexes: the Index of In-
stitutional E¢ ciency and the Index of Bureaucratic e¢ ciency. The ￿rst
index is made up by nine indices and the second one by three indices3.
The main result of this contribution is that the institutional ine¢ -
ciency, determined also by the level of corruption, causes a low invest-
ment thus the institutions by lowering the investment rate negatively
a⁄ect the growth rate. There could be a sort of linkages between corrup-
tion and instability due to the existence of the strategic complementarity
determined by the willingness to get a high bribe rate today to the detri-
ment of economic performance and, in that way, generating instability
because the government will be less probability to save the power in the
future.
That encourages the other politicians to do the some behavior when
they will get the power, for this reason raise up coordination problems
generating multiple equilibria (Mauro, 1995 ). There are other two types
of indices used to investigate empirically the relationship between insti-
tutions and economic growth, as the International Country Risk Guide
( ICRG ) and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence ( BERI ) 4, they
are put into relationship with the annual GDP per capita growth and
the Private Investment over GDP in the period 1974 - 1989 (Keefer and
Knack, 1995 ), the main result is that one standard deviation increase of
ICRG index of 13.5 determines an increase of annual per capita income
growth rate of 1.24.
Alcala￿and Ciccone ( 2004 ) use a di⁄erent Index of Institutional
Quality based on the bureaucratic quality, the property right protection
ant the kind of law and order, reaching the result that this kind of
measure of institutional quality has a positive impact on the GDP per
capita.
Knack and Keefer ( 1997 ) investigate as well how the average an-
nual growth per capita income and the ratio Investment over GDP are
in￿ uenced by the level of Trust and by the Civic Norms. They consider
the period 1980-1992 and reach the conclusion that there is a positive
relationship between the Trust and the annual rate per capita income
growth, but it is still open the debate in literature on how is possible to
measure the level of Trust and of the civic Norms.
In the aim to prove the relationship between the economic develop-
14ment and the institutional domain it is also used another institutional
index denominated Contract Intensive Money ( CIM ), this index is
equal to the ratio between the non currency and the total money sup-
ply, the higher is the value of this ratio the higher is the trust of the
people towards the e¢ ciency of the property rights and of the contract
enforcements. That is because the economic agents prefer to use the non
currency money in order to formally recorded their transactions in case
of some arguing related to the contract. Otherwise in the country where
there is an ine¢ cient legal and policy environment the people prefer to
use the currency to avoid government taxation or because they have a
low consideration of the ￿nancial system e¢ ciency and of the govern-
ment regulation of the ￿nancial institutions. Claugue, Keefer, Knack
and Olson ( 1999 ) ￿nd that the CIM is positively related to the growth,
but there are also many possibilities that the value of this kind of index
could be in￿ uenced by variations in ￿nancial development or by the de-
cisions of the Central Bank in each countries in the ￿elds of monetary
policy, in￿ ation rate and exchange rates. It is also important to mention
another interesting result achieved by Esfahami and Ramirez ( 2003 )
related to the positive in￿ uence of the contract enforcement on the GDP
per capita growth, so it is observable that the institutional capabilities
lend credibility and e⁄ectiveness to government policy playing a key role
in the development process through infrastructure growth.
Another interesting investigation was developed about the relation-
ship between the Average Dollar Wages in manufacturing during the
period 1985 - 1989 in countries like Mexico and the Freedom House
Index ( Rodrik, 1999 )5. He ￿nd that there is a positively and statis-
tically signi￿cant association between the extent of democracy and the
level of manufacturing wages in a country where is observed this kind
of evolution, thus he underlines that the institutions matter to distrib-
utive outcomes. As the approach of Claugue, Keefer, Knack and Olson
( 1999 ), but analyzing the GDP per capita instead of the annual per
capita GDP growth, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi ( 2004 ) show,
using as measure of institution the Rule of the Law Index6, how this
index in￿ uences positively the GDP per capita. Using the Index of De-
mocratization, de￿ned by the existence of an autocratic leadership or
a democratic one, Jones and Olken ( 2005 ) highlight that after the
death of the leaders in the autocratic regimes the level of the Index of
Democratization in￿ uences positively the annual growth.
Considering the log GDP per capita as dependent variable, Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson ( 2001 ) investigate the in￿ uence of the
protection against expropriation risk on this variable. The data set of
this kind of institutional variable is concerned to the period 1985 - 1995
15and they get an interesting result showing a positive correlation between
the protection against expropriation risk and the log GDP per capita.
using Ordinary Least - Squares Regression. Starting from this setting
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson ( 2002 ) introduce another dependent
variable as the Urbanization and other measures of institutional frame-
work distinguished in: Current Institutions and Early Institutions. In
the ￿rst group they include the protection against expropriate risk and
the Executive constraints in 1990 7, at the second group belong the
Executive Constraints in 1900 and the Initial Executive Constraints 8.
Also in this analysis they point out a positive relationship between the
log GDP per capita and the index of expropriation risk using as instru-
mental variable the Settler Mortality 9. Following the previous analysis
Acemoglu and Johnson ( 2005 ) consider a scenario in which there are
additional dependent variables as: the ratio of investment to GDP 10
, credit to the private sector as a percentage of the GDP in 1998 11 ,
the average stock market capitalization over GDP 12. They also consider
di⁄erent institutional variables splitted in: Contracting institutions and
Property rights institutions. The ￿rst type correspond to a legal formal-
ism identi￿ed as a number of legal procedures necessary to solve a simple
case of judicial controversy and the second one is moreover partitioned
in: executive constraints and protection against expropriation risk. Us-
ing this type of institutional variables it is reached the result that the
increase of expropriation risk and legal formalism determine an increase
in the GDP per capita. Furthermore they use the following Instrumen-
tal Variables, adding to the Settler Mortality the log of the indigenous
population density in 1500 in the colonies 13 and legal origins 14. The
instrumental variables permit to point out that the property right insti-
tutions have a major in￿ uence or di⁄erent component as the long run
economic growth, the investment and the ￿nancial development. On the
other side the impact of contracting institutions is more evident on the
￿nancial intermediation but less remarkable on investment , growth and
the total amount of credit in the economy.
An other way to analyze the in￿ uence of institutional environment
on economic phenomena is to consider the linkages between the output
per worker, where the output is obtained subtracting the value added in
the mining industry, and an index of social infrastructure as measure of
institutions and government policies by which are determined incentives
for economic agents 15, following this approach it is been obtained that
in case of one standard deviation increase in the social infrastructure in-
dex of 0.25 the output per worker raises using OLS of 128 % ( Hall and
Jones, 1999 ). Also Masters and McMillan ( 2001 ) show how the Index
of Social Infrastructure, measured as the policies of the Government and
16the Institutions that sustain the individuals and the ￿rms operating in
the economic system, has a positive impact on the output per worker in
the tropical countries. A similar result is reached by Bockstette, Chanda
and Putterman ( 2002 ) , investigating on the relationship between the
State Antiquity and di⁄erences in the growth rates, point out that ex-
ists an observable link between the social infrastructure and the cross -
country di⁄erence in worker productivity. Another kind of analysis, re-
lated to the role of the Index of the social infrastructure ( Kogel , 2005 )
has clearly pointed out that this index impacts positively on the annual
average Total Factor Productivity growth rate using cross country data.
Glaser, La Porta , Salines and Shleifer ( 2004 ) start to consider the
possibility to discuss about the e¢ cacy of the institutional indicators in
the perspective to give a strong proof of the institutions in￿ uence on the
growth, and they reach the conclusions that some countries start devel-
opment processes also under a dictatorship and, in the following time,
decide to make better their political institutions. They ￿nd a negative
in￿ uence of the constraints on executive on the GDP per capita control-
ling for year of schooling and population in temperate zone, furthermore
they point out that there are additional evidences proving the main in-
￿ uence of the human capital rather that institutions on the growth.
Using some measures of ￿nancial institutions as Private Credit, Liq-
uid Liabilities, Bank Assets and the ratio of the Commercial Bank assets
to the sum of Commercial plus Central Bank Assets, Aghion, Howitt,
Mayer-Foulkes ( 2005 ) clearly a¢ rm that the level of schooling, the ge-
ographic characteristic, the health, the politics and the institutions do
not a⁄ect the signi￿cance of the interaction between ￿nancial interme-
diation and initial per capita GDP, and do not show any independent
e⁄ect on convergence phenomenon.
The empirical investigation on the relationship between Institutions
and Development is carachterized by two main problems as the Reverse
Causality and the existence of a very short time series of the institutional
indicators. The main literature has evaluated the linkages between eco-
nomic development and quality of institution employing, in many cases,
the linear regression or panel data analysis. The quality of institutions
is considered as an exogenous variable and, clearly, this intrinsic as-
sumption doesn￿ t take into account the possible feedback between the
institutions and development and viceversa, thus the existence of a re-
verse causality is not considered relevant in the end of the analysis. It
is also necessary to underline that the use of the panel data analysis is
due to the lack of long time series with the annual data, this not al-
lows the use of the Vector Auto Regressive model or Vector Equilibrium
Correction Model useful to develop a cointegration analysis in order to
17highlight the existence of reverse or bidirectional causality.
4 The relevance of Institutional Complementarities
in the Development Processes
The events related to the existence of the complementarities can strongly
support the relevance of the links between the institutional framework
and development processes. Many scholars in di⁄erent ways have used
the complementarities in order to explain the feature of development
processes potentially generated from the presence of particular institu-
tional variables in the economic system. The relationship between Social
Capital and economic performances are considered strictly related to the
in￿ uence of the organization membership on to the government quality
thus due to good government quality it is possible to determine the eco-
nomic development ( Putnam, 1993 ), but there are still many problems
strictly connected to the di¢ culty to ￿nd a right criterium to measure the
social capital. Other di⁄erent kinds of synergistic relations and comple-
mentarity￿ s relationships have been pointed out in the literature related
to the economic development during the last twenty years.
The role of the complementarities in the development processes was
￿rstly considered by Rosenstein - Rodan ( 1943 ) and Hirshman ( 1958
). As is well known the complementarities can be considered as a special
type of externalities, the core￿ s meaning of the externalities is that they
take place when many agents are undertaking the same action and, for
this reason, the cost of this action is lower or the bene￿t of this action
is higher. Clearly this kind of interaction between the agents in an eco-
nomic system can generate, mainly, manifold e⁄ects as the presence of
multiple equilibria, the fact that the equilibrium reached in each eco-
nomic system depends on the characteristic of the initial conditions of
its and, ￿nally, the possibility that short run decision can have long run
e⁄ects in the economy. In Rosenstein - Rodan ( 1943 ) and Hirshman
( 1958 ) are considered the complementarities between di⁄erent sectors
of the economy and the possibility that the economic system, because
of this link, can reach good or bad equilibria. Focusing the attention on
demand complementarities ( Murphy, et al., 1989a ) considering the pos-
sibility that a Big Push in industrialization can determine the change
from a bad to a good equilibrium. This point of view can bring into
question in many ways, considering the case in which the demand ef-
fects connected with increasing returns industries can be less evident
when they happen in an economic system with signi￿cant international
trade. Furthermore the spillover e⁄ects can be generated by many other
18factors as the introduction of new technologies, the existence of new
rules, the role of the government and so on. This kind of blind points
allow to strongly underline that the study of the complementarity in the
economics it is very useful to understand better the complexity of the
economic system. Thus the existence of the positive or negative coor-
dination e⁄ects in the development processes comes up mainly through
speci￿c feature of the markets, particular interactions between the di⁄er-
ent agents and the presence of externalities related to the technological
characteristic of the di⁄erent agents operating in the economic system.
As an example the behavior of one agent depends on the actions adopted
by the other agents in the economic system, thus this possibility may
determine di⁄erent kind of equilibria in the economic system that can
be the consequence of the coordination problems.
Some theoretical explanation of this kind of problems can be found
in the model in which the individuals are supposed to have bureaucratic
behavior and innovative behavior ( Sah and Stiglitz, 1989 ). In case the
agents choose the bureaucratic behavior they create a barrier to the in-
novations and this negatively in￿ uences the kind of equilibrium that can
be the worse one. Otherwise if the agents decide to adopt an innovative
behavior, by the existence of complementarity between the actions, the
economic system can reach a good equilibrium, the best one. As a conse-
quence the performance of the economic system can be in￿ uenced by the
number of how many agents have a bureaucratic or innovative behavior.
Clearly, under these conditions, rise up a coordination problem that can
generate multiple equilibria because of the complementarity between the
set of agents behaving bureaucratically and innovatively.
Another similar approach about the explanation on how the econ-
omy moves to an equilibrium rather than to another is given by the
presence in some economic system of activities that are not productive
but extract income from the productive ones ( Murphy, Shleifer, Vishny,
1993 ). Looking at the di⁄erent possibilities of allocation of the popula-
tion among di⁄erent activities it is possible to observe several equilibria,
clearly the rent seeking activities assure increasing returns thus some
part of population can decide to do rent seeking activities instead of
productive activities, as a consequence the economic system can reach
a bad equilibrium because there exist a high level of rent seeking that
implies a low level of output given the small part of the population that
decide to produce something.
An interesting application of the complementarity￿ s conditions, in
the main literature, is related to the relevance of particular institutional
strategic complementarities that can develop virtuous cycles of develop-
ment processes in the economic system.
19The approach of Comparative Institutional Analysis strongly sup-
ports the important role of institutions in the economic development.
Taking into account that exists a complementarity between the insti-
tutions it is also clear that " if one wants to change to certain sub -
system, to there must also be Co-ordinated changes in complementary
institutions￿(Aoki, 1995 p.50).
It is possible to use the games theory approach to analyze this type
of linkages, but it is furthermore fundamental to organize and articu-
late in appropriate way the framework of analysis , in order to describe
completely and systematically the institutions. Considering two di⁄er-
ent economies in many cases they can have distinct institutional orders
even if they possess the same level of technology. For this reason must be
taking into account the historical and sociological aspects to explain how
some institutional orders, in "atmospheres" that appears economically
homogenous, assume di⁄erent shapes and structures.
An important aspect of the Comparative Institutional Analysis is the
interdependence between the institutions, there exist di⁄erent interac-
tions between the institutions that characterize each economic systems
and this feature can generate advantages for a system rather than for
an other. This is due to the fact that the agents are perfect rational,
but they have a rationality that can be considered uniquely connected
with the institutional framework in which interact the agents. Follow-
ing this approach become fundamental the notion of complementarity,
as usually it be seen the change in one institutional system determines
coordinated switching in the complementary institutions. The aim is to
consider the role of institutions in a context of a theoretical framework
given that the variety of institutional framework is essentially due to
the existence of strategic complementarity between them. The multiple
equilibria in a classical economic system originate from the fact that each
agent tries to solve his maximization problem taking into account the
action of the other agents and without consider the equilibrium price,
that is the main reason determining the achievement of a sub - optimal
equilibrium, so there can be di⁄erent equilibrium level that correspond
to distinct levels of activity in the economy. That can happen in case of
institutional complementarities generating "multiple institutional equi-
libria " in the game between agents involved in the institutional change,
obviously these equilibria can be "bad" or "good". Thus the structure of
the classical games theory, in which the agents using the perfect rational-
ity to obtain informations, to develop their expectations, to make beliefs
on the e⁄ects of their and other agents behaviors, can easily explain
the self - enforceability in the institutional structures as regulations,
contracts and the setting up of governance structures. In case of insti-
20tutions as conventions and social norms the most appropriate analytical
framework to describe the self - enforceability of this phenomena is rep-
resented by the evolutionary games where the players have a bounded
rationality and their decisions and behaviors are mainly in￿ uenced by
imitations and inertia. On the base of these main tools to represent the
dynamic of institutional environment Aoki de￿nes an institution as a ￿
self - sustaining system of shared belief about how the game is played￿
(Aoki, 2001 p. 26).
From an analytical point of view the appropriate way to describe the
complementarity is the supermodularity and so the games with strategic
complementarity are called supermodular games. The properties of the
supermodular function are the theoretical tools that e⁄ectively de￿ne
the notion of complementarity in economics. The de￿nition of the su-
permodular function￿ s properties needs of a set of preliminary notions
in order to explain how the concept of supermodularity and complemen-
tarity ￿t completely each other. Following Topkis ( 1978, 1998 ) it is
possible to de￿ne preliminarily the concept of the partially ordered set.
De￿nition 1 A partially ordered set, is a set A on which there is a
binary relation 4 that is re￿exive, antisymmetric and transitive (Topkis,
1998).
It is expedient to de￿ne the concept of the binary relation and recall
the de￿nitions of the each properties mentioned in the de￿nition 1.
De￿nition 2 A binary relation 4 on a set A speci￿es for all a and a0
in A either that a 4 a0 is true or that a 4 a0 is false
De￿nition 3 A binary relation 4 on a set A is re￿exive if a 4 a for
each a in A.
De￿nition 4 A binary relation 4 on a set A is antisymmetric if a0 4
a00 and a00 4 a0 imply a0 = a00 for all a0 and a00 in A.
De￿nition 5 A binary relation 4 on a set A is transitive if a0 4 a00 and
a00 4 a000 imply a0 4 a000 for all a0 , a00 , a000 in A.
After these de￿nitions it is possible to specify the additional funda-
mental concept of lattice. Considering the partially ordered set A and a
subset of A identi￿ed as A0, if a0 is in A and a 4 a0 for each a in A0, then
a0 is de￿ning an upper bound for A0. In case a0in A0is an upper bound
for A0, then it is possible to a¢ rm that a0 is the greatest element of A0.
On the other side if a0 is in A and a0 4 a for each a in A0, then a0 is a
21lower bound for A0. If a0in A0is a lower bound for A0, then it is possible
to a¢ rm that a0 is the least element of A0.
If it is considered an element a0 in A0and there isn￿ t another element
a00 in A0 with a0 4 a00, so a0is a maximal element of A0, clearly if there is
an element a0 in A0and there isn￿ t another element a00 in A0 with a00 4 a0,
so a0is a minimal element of A0:
In short it is observable that a greatest element correspond to a
maximal element and a least element correspond to a minimal element,
considering the de￿nition of partial order set it is easy to conclude that
in this type of set there can be at most one greatest or least element
but there can be the possibility that there are no maximal or minimal
element. After these important elementary de￿nitions it is possible to
consider the existence of two elements a0 and a00, in case they are be-
longing to a partially ordered set A and have a least upper bound in A
they are de￿ned as a join and can be indicated as a0 _ a00 while if they
have a greatest lower bound in A they are de￿ned as a meet and can be
speci￿ed as a0 ^ a00 . In conclusion it is possible to de￿ne a lattice as a
partially ordered set in which belong the join and meet of each pair of
its elements.16
After the de￿nition of the lattice it is important to consider the
concept of sublattice identifying a set Ai as subset of Rmi and A =
￿i2NAi ￿ Rm, clearly m =
n P
k=1
mk thus it is possible to write the
following de￿nition
De￿nition 6 A is a sublattice if it is a partially ordered subset of Rm
and if a, a￿ 2 A then a ^ a￿ and a _ a￿ 2 A
In other words if A is a sublattice of lattice Rm then it contains the
join and meet of each pair of elements that are the same as the join
and meet of the exactly same elements in Rm.
In case of strategic complementarity it is well known that an increase
in the strategies of player i￿ s rivals will increase the value of playing
a high strategy for player i, that￿ s implies the existence of increasing
di⁄erence in his utility function. Thus another fundamental concept
strictly connected with the theoretical framework of supermodular games
is the presence, in the player￿ s utility function, of increasing di⁄erences,
that it is easy to de￿ne in the following way
De￿nition 7 a function ui(ai;a￿i) has increasing di⁄erences in (ai;a￿i)
if, 8 ai;a0
i 2 Ai and 8 a￿i;a0
￿i 2 A￿i such that ai > a0
i and a￿i > a0
￿i,






22So u can be considered as a pay o⁄ function exhibiting increasing
￿rst di⁄erences if ui has increasing ￿rst di⁄erences for i = 1;::::::;n.
Now taking into account the concept of join and meet it is possible to
de￿ne the supermodular function
De￿nition 8 A function ui(ai;a￿i) is supermodular in ai if for each a￿i
holds the following inequality
ui(ai;a￿i) + ui(a0
i;a￿i) 6 ui(ai ^ a0
i;a￿i) + ui(ai _ a0
i;a￿i)
8 ai;a0
i 2 Ai and 8 a￿i 2 A￿i
Clearly by using the supermodularity it is guaranteed that the exis-
tence of increasing ￿rst di⁄erence determines strategic complementari-
ties, there can be the possibility that a function satisfy increasing ￿rst
di⁄erences but is not supermodular, in case there is a pay o⁄ function
that has increasing ￿rst di⁄erence and is not supermodular the best re-
sponse function of a single player it is not monotonically non decreasing
in the strategy of the opponent.
After the de￿nitions of: partial order set, lattice, sub lattice, increas-
ing ￿rst di⁄erences and supermodular function it is possible to de￿ne a
supermodular game.
De￿nition 9 A game ￿ = (N;A;u) is supermodular if hold the follow-
ing conditions for all the players i :
the set of strategies Ai is a sublattice of Rm
the pay o⁄ functions of the players ui has increasing di⁄erences in
(ai;a￿i)
the pay o⁄ functions of the players ui is supermodular in ai
Taking into account the de￿nitions of the supermodular function it
also possible to de￿ne the supermodular game using two other alternative
de￿nitions
De￿nition 10 A game ￿ = (N;A;u) is supermodular if the set of
strategies Ai is a sublattice of Rm for all i and
ui(a _
￿
a) + ui(a ^
￿





De￿nition 11 A game ￿ = (N;A;u) is supermodular if
@2ui(a)
@ai @aj > 0 8
i;j 2 N; 8a 2 A
Considering these di⁄erent but equivalent de￿nitions it is easy to un-
derstand that inside this type of theorethical framework it is possible to
consider all the economic situations in which there is a complementarity
23among the action sets of the economic agents. Furthermore this type of
games has very important properties from which arise some interesting
consequences. The set of players actions is a lattice so the set of the
player i best reply, BRi(a￿i) is non empty and compact for every a￿i
2 A￿i, moreover BRi(a￿i) is a sub lattice of Ai for every a￿i 2 A￿i.
The selection of the action among the available actions in a lattice set
implies that for every a￿i 2 A￿i the best reply of player i BRi(a￿i)
has a greatest element
_
BRi (a￿i), clearly comparing two actions a￿i and
a0









BRi (a￿i) is monotonically non decreasing or, in other words,
the function is upper semi continuous. That gives over and over the idea
of the complementarity among the actions and it is possible to remark
very signi￿cant consequences within the next Lemma ( Topkis, 1998 )
Lemma 12 ( Topkis, 1998 ) Consider a supermodular game ￿ = (N;A;u)
for which the set A of feasible joint strategies is non empty and compact
and the pay o⁄ function u is upper semicontinuous in ai on Ai(a￿i) for
each a￿i in A￿i and each i.
1. The set BRi(a￿i) of best responses for each player i is a non empty
compact sub lattice of Rm for each a￿i 2 A￿i.
2. The set BR (a) of best joint responses is a non empty compact
sublattice of Rm for each a in A.
3. There exists a greatest and a least best response for each player i
and each a￿i in A￿i, that is, each Ai(a￿i) has a greatest element
and a least element.
4. There exists a greatest and a least best response for each a in A;
that is, each BR (a) has a greatest element and a least element.
5. The best response correspondence BRi(a￿i) is increasing in a￿i on
A￿i for each player i.
6. The best joint response correspondence BR (a) is increasing in a
on A.
7. The greatest best response ( that is, the greatest element of BRi(a￿i)
) is an increasing function from A￿i into Ai for each player i and
the least best response ( that is, the least element of BRi(a￿i) ) is
an increasing function from A￿i into Ai for each player i.
248. The greatest best joint response ( that is, the greatest element of
BR (a) ) is an increasing function from A into A and the least
best joint response ( that is, the least element of BR (a) ) is an
increasing function from A into A.
Other important conclusions has been reached from Milgrom and
Roberts ( 1990 ) respect to the de￿nition of the supermodular games
properties, these conclusions represent another important step in order
to understand from an analytical point of view the relevance of the com-
plementarity relationship that can generate the existence of the multiple
equilibria in the supermodular games. The fundamental theorem that
Milgrom and Roberts produce is the following:
Theorem 13 ( Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 ) Let ￿ = (N;A;u) be a
supermodular game. For each player i, there exist largest and smallest
serially undominated strategies, a0
i and a00
i. Moreover, the strategy pro￿les
( a0
i; i 2 N ) and ( a00
i; i 2 N ) are pure Nash equilibrium pro￿les.
The consequences of this Theorem are very important because it
stated that all the undominated strategies belonging to an interval [a00;a0;]
where the largest and the smallest Nash equilibria correspond to maxi-
mum and minimum points.
Furthermore it is also important the next theorem ( Topkis, 1998 )
in order to completely describe how the properties of the supermodular
games ￿t totally with the economic concept of the complementarity.
Theorem 14 (Topkis, 1998 ) If ￿ = (N;A;u) is a supermodular game,
the set A of feasible joint strategies is non empty and compact, and the
pay o⁄ function ui(ai;a￿i) is upper semicontinuous in ai on Ai(a￿i) for
each a￿i in A￿i and each i, then the set of equilibrium points is a non -
empty complete lattice and a greatest and a least equilibrium point exist.
Other theorethical analysis show that in the non - cooperative games
with strategic complementarities the equilibrium set is non empty and
has an order structure inside which there are values between a minimum
and a maximum element to being a complete lattice ( Vives, 1990), also
it has been showed that in the same types of games the best response
dynamic converges to a set of values bounded from the greatest and least
elements in the set of Nash equilibrium (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 ).
After this necessary overview on the theoretical literature about the
supermodular games, it is clear that, following Aoki ( 2001 ), in case
25there exists institutional complementarity between two institutional do-
mains there exist also supermodularity conditions and thus it is as well
possible to observe multiple equilibria that correspond to a multiplic-
ity of institutional arrangements. Furthermore there is the possibility
that the institutional arrangement corresponds to a Pareto sub optimal
equilibrium, generating a bad institutional trap, because all the players
coordinate their actions in order to get the worse equilibrium and not
the best one in the set of all possible equilibria that can be a possible
outcome of the game. This kind of coordination failure is due to the
existence of institutional complementarities and to the properties of the
supermodular games, that can explain how some kind of institutions, if
they are complementary domains, can negatively or positively in￿ uence
each other. Thus changes in one institutional domain can determine
changes in the other institutional domain and this mechanism is self
sustaining, in this way the quality and the e¢ ciency of institutions can
improve or get worse.
These type of complementarities can be observed in organizational
structure, ￿nancial transaction, polity domain and corporate governance
( Aoki, 2001), but an open question it is also to explain how to detect
the perceived link between the institutional complementarities and the
development processes.
To the purpose of the answer to this question it is useful to introduce
an simple ￿gure that can give a more clear description of the actual state
of art in the literature related to the institutional complementarity.
Considering the institutions, at same time, as Rules of the Game,
Players of the Game and Strategic Equilibrium of the Game it can eas-
ily point out the possibility of the existence of several possibilities of
institutional complementarities. The scheme represented in the Figure
1 is substantially divided in two parts. In the institutional domain there
are di⁄erent institutions that can have distinct characteristics depend-
ing on the types of interaction in which they are involved, this means
two fundamental things: ￿rstly the institutions are the expression of a
multiplicity related to the di⁄erent role that they can play in the inter-
actions existing in the economic system; secondly there is a mutually
interaction between the rules of games that can impose incentives and
constraints but can be changed as well from whose stand their action.
This structure guarantees the existence of the complementarities and the
presence of a synchronic structure of institutional linkages, furthermore
the analysis of these kind of relationships is very complex because of the
perceptible di¢ culty to detect the authentic institutional links and the
real interdependency among di⁄erent institutional contexts.
The second part is represented by the development processes, it is
2627clear that the development processes can be in￿ uenced by what kind of
the complementarities are inside the institutional domain but it is also
observable that the development processes can determine changement
in the institutional domain. Sometimes, after positive switching in the
economy, sourced by the economic development, new institutions are
made up on the base of new economic environment. This kind of feed
back it is relevant because introduce an additional possibility of com-
plementarity in the long run such that better institutions can generate
development processes and better economic conditions can require the
existence of better institutions and so on. At same time, the underde-
velopment that rise up after economic crisis can encourage the creation
of a bad institutional environment beginning a vicious circle. That is
what it is possible to de￿ne as the probability of the existence of a "bad
institutional trap"
5 Conclusions
The aim of this survey is basically to give an overview on the literature
that investigates the relationship between the institutions and the phe-
nomena of the growth and development. In order to do this it has been
necessary to recall the main strands of the literature on the institutional
economics. Like a funnel - shaped the attention it has been focus, sub-
sequently, on the ways in which it has been performed the empirical and
the theoretical analysis of the relationship between the economic devel-
opment and the role of institutions. Why it is a common belief that there
is a link between the institutions and the economic development? Each
of us can easily perceive that it is easier to do some economic actions in a
context where all the types of institution are e¢ cient, but these are just
an aspect of the reality. In other words our perception of the existence
of this linkage must be considered in an aggregate way and taking into
account other economic variables that can in￿ uence the development.
As it is clear the ￿rst di¢ culty is the de￿nition of what an institution
is and that is the reason why in the survey it has given dig relevance
to the di⁄erent manners to conceptualize the notion of institution. The
second di¢ culty arises from the perplexity about how the e¢ ciency of
the institutions can be measured. The third problem is related to the
necessity to close o⁄in the right way the weight and the in￿ uence of the
institutions respect to the other variables on the economic development.
Taking into account these relevant di¢ culties, the analysis of the
complementarities involved in the development processes, can be a use-
ful way to explain some kinds of relationship between institutions and
development processes especially in the short run. The use of more elab-
28orated indices to measure the in￿ uence of institutions in the economic
system and of the coentegration models can improve the reliability of
the empirical analysis. In the same manner the supermodularity and
the supermodular games can e¢ ciently explain the mechanism of the
strategic complementarity between di⁄erent kinds of institution gener-
ating virtuous development processes from a theoretical point of view.
Necessarily, in the future, both the analysis must be integrated but, for
the time being, the state of art in the two approaches represent a very
good starting point for new outcomes related to the investigation on
these type of kind of economic phenomena.
The importance of the mechanisms of complementarity is mainly
justi￿ed from the not plausible existence of an one-way link between
institutional domain and development, on the other hand it is clearly
true that there is a mutually interaction between the two spheres. Finally
it is also important to distinguish, in the upcoming analysis, between the
existence of determined institutions and the performance of determined
institutions in the economic systems. Not always the existence of an
institution determines positive or negative e⁄ect on the development
and viceversa, this kind of relationship it is also under the in￿ uence of
the performances of it, that gives us an idea of the complexity of the
problem.
Notes
1"The di¢ culty in de￿ning a ￿eld for the so-called institutional economics is the
uncertainty of meaning of an institution. Sometimes an institution seems to mean a
framework of laws or natural rights within which individuals act like inmates.
Sometimes it seems to mean the behavior of the inmates themselves. Sometimes
anything additional to or critical of the classical or hedonic economics is deemed to
be institutional. Sometimes anything that is "economic behavior" is institutional.
Sometimes anything that is "dynamic" instead of "static," or a "process" instead
of commodities, or activity instead of feelings, or mass action instead of individual
action, or management instead of equilibrium, or control instead of laissez faire,
seems to be institutional economics. All of these notions are doubtless involved
in institutional economics, but they may be said to be metaphors or descriptions,
whereas a science of economic behavior requires analysis into similarities of cause,
e⁄ect or purpose and a synthesis in
a uni￿ed system of principles." Commons J. R. (1931),"Institutional Economics"
American Economic Review, vol. 21 , p.648.
2As is well known the Institutional Political Economy strongly challanges the
neoclassical approach, continuing on the same tendency followed by the traditional
institutionalism, while the New Institutional economics using the theories of asym-
metric and distributed information tries to combine the institutionalism with the neo
- classical framework.
3Index of institutional ec / ciency: poltical stability, political chenge, probability
of opposition Group takeover, Relationship with neighboring Countries, Terrorism,
Legal System Judiciary, Bureaucracy and red tape, Corruption.
29Index of bureaucratic e¢ ciency: judiciary system, red tape and corruption in-
dices. They are used in the article " Corruption and Growth " ( Mauro, 1995 ) and it
is important to point out the way to consider the corruption as the degree to which
business transactions involve corruption or questionable payments.
4International Country Risk Guide (ICRG): composed by: protection against ex-
propriation risk; rule of law; repudiation of contracts by Government, corruption in
Government, quality of Bureaucracy Business Enviromental Risk Intelige ( BERI ):
Composed by: contract enforceability, infrastructure quality, nazionalization poten-
tial, bureaucratic delays.
5The Freedom House Index is a composite index that measure the level of political
rights and and civil liberties available for 172 countries from the biginning of 1970s
6This index is made up from some components like the incidence of both violent
and non-violent crime, the e⁄ectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the
enforceability of contracts. These indicators represent a reliable measure of an en-
vironment in which fair and predictable rules are the basis for economic and social
interactions. The component indicators are aggregated using an unobserved com-
ponents model that expresses the observed data in each cluster as a linear function
of the unobserved common component of governance, plus a disturbance term cap-
turing perception errors and/or sampling variation in each indicator. The choice of
units for governance ensures that the estimates of governance have a mean of zero,
a standard deviation of one, and range from around ￿ 2.5 to around 2.5. A higher or
positive value indicate greater rule of law ( Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido- Lobaton,
2002 ).
7Executive Constraints represents the operational independence of Chief Execu-
tive.( Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change. 1800-1986. Robert Gurr,
1997 )
8The ￿rst value of Executive Constraints in the data set Polity III ( Gurr, 1997 ).
9The logarithm of estimated European settlers mortality during the Coloniza-
tion, it measures the e⁄ects of local diseases on people without inherited or acquired
immunities.
10This variable is considere in current prices average from 1990 to 1999.
11Considered as ￿nancial resources provided to the private sector, such as through
loans, purchase of non equity sicurities and credits and other accounts receivable,
that establish a claim for payment.
12Correspond to an average the Market value of all traded stocks over 1990 - 1995.
13This variable is calculated as the total population divided by land area usable
for agricolture.
14The variable states if the legal origin of the company law and commercial code
of each country are from civil law countries or from common law countries.
15This index is determined by two sub indices: index of government antidiversion
policies and index of country￿ s openness. The ￿rst one combines ￿ve indicators:
law and order, bureaucratic quality, corruption, risk of expropriation, government
repudiation of contracts. The second one de￿nes a country open if: non tari⁄ barriers
cover less than 40% of trade, average tarix o rates are less than 40%, any black market
premium was less than 20% during 1970s and 1980s, country is not classi￿ed as
socialist following Kornai ( 1992 ), the government does not monopolize major exports
( Hall and Jones, 1999, p.16 ).
16Considering a set A = f(0;0);(1;2);(2;1);(3;3)g it is possible to de￿ne it a
complete lattice because (2;1) _ (1;2) = (3;3) and (2;1) ^ (1;2) = (0;0)
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